Concealment vs. Lies

NOTE: This is an unofficial, authorized translation by Dyson Devine and Vivienne Legg and may contain errors.

FIGU-Bulletin Nr. 28,

May 2000

Pages 9-10

Readers' Question

Now a question of morality: is it really right, always - and really always - to tell the truth, even if one knows, in a certain situation, that a selfless lie could prevent suffering and thereby would actually only have advantages?

The philosopher Immanuel Kant cites, as an example of his categorical imperative, the following case: a man pursued by a murderer seeks protection with a neighbour and hides in his house.

Now, were the neighbour asked by the murderer whether he hid the man he seeks in his house, then he must tell the truth and hand the defenceless man over to the murderer.

In order not to break the law, he must, in every case, tell the truth, as it is also expected by his fellow humans.

What is to be made of this and what do the creational laws say about it?

N.L./Germany

Answer

Immanuel Kant's uncompromising stance - that a concealment of something is designated a lie or an evasive lie - which is also advocated by various other philosophers, is, in the framework of this reference, not correct.

Therefore when, in the aforementioned example by Kant, the presence of the one sought by the murderer is concealed by the neighbour, then that has nothing to do with a lie or an evasive lie, rather solely and alone with a fact's concealment, which results due to reasons of conscience and for the protection of the life of another human being.

A lie or an evasive lie is something completely different to a concealment of a fact - there can be no argument about that - not even if all the philosophers in the world oppose it by screaming blue murder and running amok.

A lie or an evasive lie is, in every case, a conscious, untrue deception and statement for the purpose of one's own wellbeing and profit, and so forth.

A lie or evasive lie is, and therefore always remains, a deliberate distortion of the truth for one's own advantage, and indeed also in regard to feelings and emotions.

Lies and evasive lies are a twisting of the facts - as well as intentional ambiguities, vagueness and hypocrisy - for the sake of one's own advantage in any kind of form.

Lies and evasive lies are, therefore, something false, which originate from a craving for recognition, from angst, cowardice, revenge, hate or false love, and so forth.

In any kind of form - also in regard to morality - lies and evasive lies are always an end in themselves and egoistic.

From this the human thus avoids himself and adopts unworthy behaviour.

To conceal something does not count as a lie nor as an evasive lie - whereby the evasive lie is just as strictly delineated as is the actual lie.

A concealment is based on a fact which could be communicated, about which, nevertheless, one remains silent, which, for example, can certainly be done for reasons of conscience or for the protection of one's self or another person.

Through the concealment - which in no way can be equated with a lie or an evasive lie - the actual facts of a matter can therefore be concealed.

How that appears in a particular case always is dictated by the situation, which certainly may be clear.

Yet it is certain that a concealment, respectively, remaining silent, has nothing to do with a lie or an evasive lie, which in each case, always, in some form or other, relate to things which are ends in themselves.

Concealment of, or remaining silent about, facts are, nevertheless, always and without exception a question of conscience, which can only be resolved through clear reason and in compliance with the related laws.

This is the viewpoint of the spiritual teaching, which, as is apparent, is not compatible with the stated views of terrestrial philosophers, who, in their thinking as well as their expositions and explanations, are able to speak and philosophise in a way pertaining to purely material intellectual rationality.

Billy

FIGU-Bulletin Nr. 28,

Mai 2000

May 2000

Seiten 9-10

Pages 9-10


Leserfrage

Readers' Question


Jetzt mal eine moralische Frage: Ist es wirklich rechtens, immer und wirklich immer die Wahrheit zu sagen, auch wenn man in einer bestimmten Situation weiss, dass eine selbstlose Lüge Leid verhindern könnte und somit eigentlich nur Vorteile hätte?

Now a question of morality: is it really right, always - and really always - to tell the truth, even if one knows, in a certain situation, that a selfless lie could prevent suffering and thereby would actually only have advantages?

Der Philosoph Immanuel Kant führt als Beispiel für seinen kategorischen Imperativ folgenden Fall an: Ein von einem Mörder gejagter Mann sucht Schutz bei einem Nachbarn und versteckt sich in dessen Haus.

The philosopher Immanuel Kant cites, as an example of his categorical imperative, the following case: a man pursued by a murderer seeks protection with a neighbour and hides in his house.

Wird der Nachbar nun vom Mörder gefragt, ob er den gesuchten Nachbarn in seinem Haus versteckte, muss dieser die Wahrheit sagen und den wehrlosen Mann dem Mörder ausliefern.

Now, were the neighbour asked by the murderer whether he hid the man he seeks in his house, then he must tell the truth and hand the defenceless man over to the murderer.

Um nicht das Gesetz zu brechen, muss er in jedem Fall die Wahrheit sagen, wie es auch von den Mitmenschen erwartet wird.

In order not to break the law, he must, in every case, tell the truth, as it is also expected by his fellow humans.

Was ist davon zu halten und was sagen die schöpferischen Gesetze dazu?

What is to be made of this and what do the creational laws say about it?


N.L./Deutschland

N.L./Germany


Antwort

Answer


Immanuel Kants kompromissloser Standpunkt, der auch von verschiedenen anderen Philosophen vertreten
wird, ist im Rahmen des Bezugs dessen unrichtig, dass eine Verheimlichung von etwas als Lüge oder Notlüge
bezeichnet wird.

Immanuel Kant's uncompromising stance - that a concealment of something is designated a lie or an evasive lie - which is also advocated by various other philosophers, is, in the framework of this reference, not correct.

Wenn also im vorgenannten Kant-Beispiel die Anwesenheit des durch den Mörder Gesuchten vom Nachbarn verheimlicht wird, dann hat das nichts mit einer Lüge oder Notlüge zu tun, sondern einzig und allein mit einer Verheimlichung eine Tatsache, die aus Gewissensgründen und zum Schutz des Lebens eines anderen Menschen erfolgt.

Therefore when, in the aforementioned example by Kant, the presence of the one sought by the murderer is concealed by the neighbour, then that has nothing to do with a lie or an evasive lie, rather solely and alone with a fact's concealment, which results due to reasons of conscience and for the protection of the life of another human being.

Eine Lüge oder Notlüge ist etwas völlig anderes als eine Verheimlichung einer Tatsache – darüber lässt sich nicht streiten, und zwar auch dann nicht, wenn alle Philosophen der Welt dagegen Zeter und Mordio schreien und Amok laufen.

A lie or an evasive lie is something completely different to a concealment of a fact - there can be no argument about that - not even if all the philosophers in the world oppose it by screaming blue murder and running amok.

Eine Lüge oder Notlüge ist in jedem Fall immer eine bewusste, unwahre Täuschung und Aussage zum eigenen Wohl und Profit usw.

A lie or an evasive lie is, in every case, a conscious, untrue deception and statement for the purpose of one's own wellbeing and profit, and so forth.

Eine Lüge oder Notlüge ist und bleibt also immer eine absichtliche Entstellung der Wahrheit zum eigenen Vorteil, und zwar auch in Hinsicht von Gefühlen und Emotionen.

A lie or evasive lie is, and therefore always remains, a deliberate distortion of the truth for one's own advantage, and indeed also in regard to feelings and emotions.

Lüge und Notlüge sind Verdrehungen der Tatsachen sowie gewollte Zweideutigkeiten, Unbestimmtheiten und Heuchelei zum eigenen Vorteil in irgendwelcher Form.

Lies and evasive lies are a twisting of the facts - as well as intentional ambiguities, vagueness and hypocrisy - for the sake of one's own advantage in any kind of form.

Lügen und Notlügen sind also etwas Unechtes, das aus einem Geltungstrieb, aus Angst, Feigheit, Rachsucht, Hass oder falscher Liebe usw. entsteht.

Lies and evasive lies are, therefore, something false, which originate from a craving for recognition, from angst, cowardice, revenge, hate or false love, and so forth.

In irgendeiner Form – auch in moralischer Hinsicht – sind Lügen und Notlügen immer selbstzweckbezogen und egoistisch.

In any kind of form - also in regard to morality - lies and evasive lies are always an end in themselves and egoistic.

Daher weicht der Mensch damit sich selbst aus und macht sich zur eigenen Nichtswürdigkeit.

From this the human thus avoids himself and adopts unworthy behaviour.


Etwas zu verheimlichen gilt nicht als Lüge und nicht als Notlüge – wobei die Notlüge ebenso strikt begrenzt
ist wie die eigentliche Lüge.

To conceal something does not count as a lie nor as an evasive lie - whereby the evasive lie is just as strictly delineated as is the actual lie.

Eine Verheimlichung beruht auf einer Tatsache, die man mitteilen könnte, die man jedoch bewusst verschweigt, was z.B. sehr wohl aus Gewissensgründen getan werden kann oder zum Schutz der eigenen oder einer anderen Person.

A concealment is based on a fact which could be communicated, about which, nevertheless, one remains silent, which, for example, can certainly be done for reasons of conscience or for the protection of one's self or another person.

Durch die Verheimlichung, die in keiner Weise mit einer Lüge oder Notlüge gleichzusetzen ist, kann also ein wirklicher Sachverhalt verschwiegen werden.

Through the concealment - which in no way can be equated with a lie or an evasive lie - the actual facts of a matter can therefore be concealed.

Wie das im Einzelfall aussieht, ergibt sich immer aus der Situation, was sicher klar sein dürfte.

How that appears in a particular case always is dictated by the situation, which certainly may be clear.

Doch fest steht, dass ein Verheimlichen resp. Verschweigen nichts mit einer Lüge oder Notlüge zu tun hat, die in jedem Fall immer in irgendeiner Form selbstzweckbezogen sind.

Yet it is certain that a concealment, respectively, remaining silent, has nothing to do with a lie or an evasive lie, which in each case, always, in some form or other, relate to things which are ends in themselves.

Eine Verheimlichung und ein Verschweigen von Tatsachen sind jedoch immer und ausnahmslos eine Gewissensfrage, die nur durch klare Vernunft und in Befolgung der diesbezüglichen Gesetze geklärt werden kann.

Concealment of, or remaining silent about, facts are, nevertheless, always and without exception a question of conscience, which can only be resolved through clear reason and in compliance with the related laws.

Dies ist der Standpunkt der Geisteslehre, die, wie ersichtlich, nicht mit den Aussagen irdischer Philosophen vereinbar ist, die in ihrem Denken sowie in ihren Auslegungen und Erklärungen rein materiell-verstandesmässig zu reden und zu philosophieren vermögen.

This is the viewpoint of the spiritual teaching, which, as is apparent, is not compatible with the stated views of terrestrial philosophers, who, in their thinking as well as their expositions and explanations, are able to speak and philosophise in a way pertaining to purely material intellectual rationality.

Billy

Michael Horn

December 12, 2009